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Abstract. This paper studies reinforcement learning (RL) under malicious falsi-
fication on cost signals and introduces a quantitative framework of attack models
to understand the vulnerabilities of RL. Focusing on Q-learning, we show that
Q-learning algorithms converge under stealthy attacks and bounded falsifications
on cost signals. We characterize the relation between the falsified cost and the
Q-factors as well as the policy learned by the learning agent which provides fun-
damental limits for feasible offensive and defensive moves. We propose a robust
region in terms of the cost within which the adversary can never achieve the tar-
geted policy. We provide conditions on the falsified cost which can mislead the
agent to learn an adversary’s favored policy. A numerical case study of water
reservoir control is provided to show the potential hazards of RL in learning-
based control systems and corroborate the results.
Keywords: Reinforcement Learning · Cybersecurity · Q-Learning · Deception
and Counterdeception · Adversarial Learning.
1 Introduction
Reinforcement Learning (RL) is a paradigm for making online decisions in uncertain
environment. Recent applications of RL algorithms to Cyber-Physical Systems en-
ables real-time data-driven control of autonomous systems and improves the system
resilience to failures. However, the integration of RL mechanisms also exposes CPS to
new vulnerabilities. One type of threats arises from the feedback architecture of the RL
algorithms depicted in Fig. 1. An adversary can launch a man-in-the-middle attack to
delay, obscure and manipulate the observation data that are needed for making online
decisions. This type of adversarial behavior poses a great threat to CPS. For example,
self-driving platooning vehicles can collide with each other when their observation data
are manipulated [2]. Similarly, drones can be weaponized by terrorists to create chaotic
and vicious situations where they are commanded to collide to a crowd or a building.
Hence it is imperative to understand the adversarial behaviors of RL and establish
a theoretic framework to analyze the impact of the attacks on RLs. One key aspect that
makes RL security unique is its feedback architecture which includes components of
sensing, control, and actuation as is shown in Fig. 1. These components are subject to
different types of cyber threats. For example, during the learning process, agent learns
optimal policy from sequential observations from the environment. An adversary may
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perturb the environment to deteriorate the learning results. This type of attack is called
environment attack. Agents observe the environment via their sensors. But the sensory
observation of the state may be delayed, perturbed, or falsified under malicious attacks
which are usually called sensors attack. There are also actuator attacks and attacks on
reward/cost signals. The latter refers to manipulation of the reward signal produced by
the environment in response to the actions applied by a RL agent, which can signifi-
cantly affect the learning process. Take a RL-based Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) as
an example, if the reward depends on the distance of the UAV to a desired destination
measured by GPS coordinates, spoofing of GPS signals by the adversary may result in
incorrect reward/cost signals.
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Fig. 1.Main components of a RL agent and potential attacks that can be applied to these compo-
nents.
In this paper, we study RL under malicious manipulation of cost signals from an
offensive perspective where an adversary/attacker maliciously falsifies the cost signals.
We first introduce a general formulation of attack models by defining the objectives,
information structure and the capability of an adversary. We focus our research on a
class of Q-learning algorithm and aim to address two fundamental questions. The first
one is on the impact of the falsification of cost signals on the convergence ofQ-learning
algorithm. The second one is on how the RL algorithm can be misled under malicious
falsifications. We show that under stealthy attacks and bounded falsifications on the cost
signals, the Q-learning algorithm converges almost surely. If the algorithm converges,
we characterize the relationship between the falsified cost and the limit of Q-factors by
an implicit map. We show that the implicit map has several useful properties includ-
ing differentiability, Lipschitz continuity etc, which help to find fundamental limits of
adversarial behavior. In particular, from the implicit map, we study how the falsified
cost affect the policy that agents learn. We show that the map is uniformly Lipschitz
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continuous with an explicit Lipschitz constant and based on this, we characterize a ro-
bust region where the adversary can never achieve his desired policy if the falsified
cost stays in the robust region. The map is shown to be Fre´chet differentiable almost
everywhere and Fre´chet derivative is explicitly characterized which is independent of
the falsified cost. The map has ‘piece-wise linear’ property on a normed vector space.
The derivative and ‘piece-wise linear’ property can be utilized by the adversary to drive
the Q-factors to a desired region by falsifying cost signals properly. We show that once
the falsified cost satisfies a set of ineqialities, the RL agent can be mislead to learn the
policy manipulated by the adversary. Further, we give conditions under which the ad-
versary can attain any policy even if the adversary is only capable of falsifying the cost
at a subset of the state space. In the end, An example is presented to illustrate potential
hazards that might be caused by malicious cost falsification. The main contributions of
our paper can be summarized as follows:
1. We establish a theoretic framework to study strategic manipulation/falsifications on
cost signals in RL and present a set of attack models on RL.
2. We provide an analytical results to understand how falsification on cost singals can
affect Q-factors and hence the policies learned by RL agents.
3. We characterize conditions on deceptively falsified cost signals under which Q-
factors learned by agents can produce the policy that adversaries aim for.
4. We use a case study of water reservoir to illustrate the severe damages of insecure
RL that can be inflicted on critical infrastructures and demonstrate the need for
defense mechanisms for RL.
1.1 Related Works
Very few works have explicitly studied security issues of RL [1]. There is a large lit-
erature on adversarial machine learning, whose focus is on studying the vulnerability
of supervised learning. However, we aim to provide a fundamental understanding of
security risks of RL which is different from both supervised learning and unsupervised
learning [21]. So, there remains a need for a solid theoretic foundation on security prob-
lems of RL so that many critical applications would be safeguarded from potential RL
risks.
One area relevant to security of RL is safe RL [10], which aims to ensure that agents
learn to behave in compliance with some pre-defined criteria. The security problem,
however, is concerned with settings where an adversary intentionally seeks to compro-
mise the normal operation of the system for malicious purposes [1]. Apart from the
distinction between RL security and safe RL, the difference between RL security and
the area of adversarial RL also exists. The adversarial RL is usually studied under multi-
agent RL settings, in which agents aim to maximize their returns or minimize their cost
in competition with other agents.
There are two recent works that have studied inaccurate cost signals. In [9], Everitt
et. al. study RL for MarkovDecision Process with corrupted reward channels where due
to some sensory errors and software bugs, agents may get corrupted reward at certain
states. But their focus is not on security perspectives and they look into unintentional
perturbation of cost signals. In [22], Wang et. al. have studiedQ-learning with perturbed
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rewards where the rewards received by RL agents are perturbed with certain probability
and the rewards take values only on a finite set. They study unintentional cost pertur-
bation from a robust perspective other than a security perspective. Compared the two
works mentioned above, our work studies RL with falsified cost signals from a security
point of view and we develop theoretical underpinnings to characterize how the falsified
cost will deteriorate the learning result.
The falsification of cost/reward signals can be viewed as one type of deception
mechanisms. The topic of defensive deception has bee surveyed in [17], which in-
cludes a taxonomy of deception mechanisms and a review of game-theoretic models.
Game and decision-theoretic models for deception have been studied in various con-
texts [12,27], including honeypots [16,18], adversarial machine learning [25,26], mov-
ing target defense [8, 28], and cyber-physical control systems [15, 19, 20, 29]. In this
work, we extend the paradigm of cyber deception to reinforcement learning and estab-
lish a theoretical foundation for understanding the impact and the fundamental limits of
such adversarial behaviors.
1.2 Organization of the Paper
In Section 2, we present preliminaries and formulate a general framework that studies
several attack models. In Section 3, we analyze the Q-learning algorithm under adver-
sarial manipulations on cost. We study under what conditions the Q-learning algorithm
converges and where it converges to. In Section 4, we present an example to corroborate
the theoretical results and their implications in the security problems of RL.
2 Preliminaries and Problem Formulation
2.1 Preliminaries
Consider one RL agent interacts with an unknown environment and attempts to min-
imize the total of its received costs. The environment is formalized as a Markov De-
cision Process (MDP) denoted by 〈S ,A ,c,P,β 〉. The MDP {Φ(t) : t ∈ Z} takes
values in a finite state space S = {1,2, ...,S} and is controlled by a sequence of ac-
tions (sometimes called a control sequence) Z = {Z(t) : t ∈ Z} taking values in a
finite action space A = {a1, ...,aA}. Throughout this paper, we use the term action
sequence and control sequence interchangeably. In our setting, we are interested in
stationary policies where the control sequence takes the form Z(t) = w(Φ(t)), where
the feedback rule w is a function w : S → A . To emphasize the policy w, we denote
Zw = {Zw(t) := w(Φ(t)) : t ∈ Z}. According to a transition probability kernel P , the
controlled transition probabilities are given by p(i, j,a) for i, j ∈S ,a∈A . Commonly
P is unknown to the agent.
Let c : S ×A → R be the one-step cost function, and consider the infinite hori-
zon discounted cost control problem of minimizing over all admissible Z the total dis-
counted cost J(i,Z) = E[∑∞t=0 β
tc(Φ(t),Z(t))|Φ(0) = i], where β ∈ (0,1) is the dis-
count factor. The minimal value function is defined as V (i) = minJ(i,Z), where the
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minimum is taken over all admissible control sequences Z. The functionV satisfies the
dynamic programming equation [3]
V (i) =min
a
[
c(i,a)+β ∑
j
p(i, j,a)V ( j)
]
, i ∈S
and the optimal control minimizing J is given by the stationary policy defined through
the feedback law w∗ given by w∗(i) := argmina[c(i,a)+β ∑ j p(i, j,a)V ( j)], i ∈ S . If
we define Q-values via
Q(i,a) = c(i,a)+β ∑
j
p(i, j,a)V ( j), i ∈S ,a ∈A ,
then V (i) =minaQ(i,a)and the matrix Q satisfies
Q(i,a) = c(i,a)+β ∑
j
p(i, j,a)min
b
Q( j,b), i ∈S ,a ∈A . (1)
If the matrix Q defined in (1) can be computed, e.g., using value iteration, then the
optimal control policy can be found by w∗(i) = argminaQ(i,a), i ∈S . When transition
probabilities are unknown, we can use a variant of stochastic approximation known as
the Q-learning algorithm proposed in [23]. The learning process is defined through the
recursion
Qn+1(i,a) = Qn(i,a)+ a(n)×
[
β min
b
Qn(Ψn+1(i,a),b)+ c(i,a)−Qn(i,a)
]
, (2)
i ∈ S ,a ∈ A , whereΨn+1(i,a) is an independently simulated S -valued random vari-
able with law p(i, ·,a).
Notations An indicator function 1C is defined as 1C(x) = 1 if x ∈ C, and 1C(x) = 0
otherwise. Denote 1i ∈ R
S a vector with S components whose ith component is 1 and
other components are 0. The true cost at time t is denoted by the shorthand notion
ct := c(Φ(t),Z(t)). For a mapping f : R
S×A → RS×A, define fia : R
S×A → R that maps
R
S×A to R where for any Q ∈ RS×A, we have [ f (Q)]i,a = fia(Q) and [ f (Q)]i,a is the
ith component and ath column of f (Q). The inverse of f is denoted by f−1. Given a
set V ⊂ RS×A, f−1(V ) is referred to the set {c : f (c) ∈ V }. Denote B(c;r) := {c˜ :
‖c˜−c‖< r} an open ball in a normed vector space with radius r and center c. Here and
in later discussion, ‖ · ‖ refers to the maximum norm.
Given c ∈ RS×A and a policy w, denote cw ∈ R
S a vector whose ith component is
c(i,w(i)) for any i ∈ S . Define ca ∈ R
S as a vector whose ith component is c(i,a).
We define Qw, Qa in the same way. For transition probability, we define Pw ∈ R
S×S
as [Pw]i, j = p(i, j,w(i)) and Pia = (p(i,1,a), p(i,2,a), ..., p(i,S,a))
T ∈ RS. Define Pa ∈
R
S×S as the matrix whose components are [Pa]i, j = p(i, j,a).
2.2 General Attack Models
Under malicious attacks, the RL agent will not be able to observe the true cost feedback
from the environment. Instead, the agent is given a cost signal that might be falsified
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by the attacker. Consider the following MDP with falsified cost (MDP-FC) denoting as
〈S ,A ,c, c˜,P,β 〉. In MDP-FC, at each time t, instead of observing ct ∈R directly, the
agent only observes a falsified cost signal denoted by c˜t ∈ R. The remaining aspects of
the MDP framework stay the same.
Attack models can be specified by three components: objective of an adversary,
actions available to the adversary, and information at his disposal. The adversary’s task
here is to design falsified cost signals c˜ based on his information structure and the
actions available to him so that he can achieve certain objectives.
Objective of Adversary: One possible objective of an adversary is to maximize the
agent’s cost while minimizing the cost of attacks. This type of objectives can be can
captured by a cost function
max
c˜
E
[ ∞
∑
t=0
β tc(Φ(t),Zw(c˜)(t))
]
−AttackCost(c˜).
The other adversarial objectives would be to drive the MDP to a targeted process or
to mislead the agent to learn certain policies the attacker aims for. Let w(c˜) denote the
policy learned by the agent under falsified cost signals c˜ and let w† denote the policy
that an attacker aims for. We can capture the objective of such a deceptive adversary by
max
c˜
1 {w†}(w(c˜))−AttackCost(c˜). (3)
Here, the second term AttackCost(c˜) serves as a measure for the cost of attacking
while the first term indicates whether the agent learns the policy w† or not. We can,
for example, define AttackCost(c˜) = ∑∞t=0 α
td(ct , c˜t), where d(·, ·) is a metric, α is a
discount factor. If d is a discrete metric, then ∑Tt=0 d(ct , c˜t) counts the number of times
of cost signals being falsified before time T . Note that here, c˜ represents all the possible
ways that an adversary can take to generate falsified signals.
Information: It is important to specify the information structure of an adversary
which determines different classes of the attacks an adversary can launch. We can cat-
egorize them as follows.
Definition 1. 1. An attacker is called an omniscient attacker if the information the
attacker has at time t, denoted by, It , is defined as
It = {P,Φ(τ),Z(τ),c : τ ≤ t}.
2. An attacker is called a peer attacker if the attacker has only access to the knowledge
of what the agent knows at time t. That means
It = {Φ(τ),Z(τ),cτ : τ ≤ t}
3. An attacker is called an ignorant attacker if at time t, he only knows the cost signals
before time t, i.e.,
It = {cτ : τ ≤ t}
4. An attacker is called a blind attacker if the information the attacker has at time t,
denoted by It , is defined as
It =∅.
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Remark 1. There are many other situations in terms of information sets of an attacker
that we can consider. In the definition of an omniscient attacker, c represents the true
cost at every state-action pair. One should differentiate it from cτ . The latter means the
true cost generated at time τ . That is to say an omniscient attack knows the true cost at
every state action pair (i,a) for all t.
Actions Available: Even if an adversary can be omniscient, it does not mean that
he can be omnipotent. The actions available to an adversary need to be defined. For
example, the attacker can only create bounded perturbations to true cost signals. In
some cases, the action of an adversary may be limited to changing the sign of the cost
at certain time or he can only falsify the cost signals at certain states in the subset
S ′ ⊂S .
The constraints on the actions available to an attacker can also be captured by the
attack cost. The cost for the type of attacks whose actions are constrained to a subset
S ′ can be captured by the following
AttackCost(c˜) =
{
0 if c˜t = ct := c(Φ(t),Z(t)), for Φ(t) ∈ S\S˜,∀t
∞ Otherwise.
Moreover, the generation of falsified costs relies heavily on the information an at-
tacker has. If the attacker is a peer attacker or an omniscient attacker, the falsified signal
c˜ can be generated through a mappingC : S ×A ×R→R, i.e., c˜t =C(Φ(t),Z(t),ct ).
If the attacker only knows the state and the cost, c˜ can be generated by the mapping
C : S ×R→R. If the attacker is ignorant, we haveC :R→R, then c˜t =C(ct).
Definition 2 (Stealthy Attacks). If c˜t takes the same value for the same state-action
pair (Φ(t),Z(t)) for all t ∈ Z, i.e., for t 6= τ , if for (Φ(t),Z(t)) = (Φ(τ),Z(τ)), we have
c˜t = c˜τ , then we say that the attacks on the cost signals are stealthy.
The definition states that the cost falsification remains consistent for the same state-
action pairs. In later discussions, we focus on stealthy attacks, which is a class of attacks
that are hard to detect. Under stealthy attackers, the falsified cost c˜ can be viewed as a
falsified cost matrix of dimension S×A. At time t, the cost received by the RL agent is
c˜(Φ(t),Z(t)).
2.3 Q-Learning with Falsified Cost
If the RL agent learns an optimal policy by Q-learning algorithm given in (2), then
under stealthy attacks on cost, the algorithm can be written as
Qn+1(i,a) = Qn(i,a)+ a(n)×
[
β min
b
Qn(Ψn+1(i,a),b)+ c˜(i,a)−Qn(i,a)
]
. (4)
Note that if the attacks are not stealthy, we need to write c˜n in lieu of c˜(i,a). There are
two important questions regarding the Q-learning algorithm with falsified cost (4): (1)
Will the sequence of Qn-factors converge? (2) Where will the sequence of Qn converge
to? We will address these two issues in next section.
8 Y. Huang and Q. Zhu.
Suppose that the sequence Qn generated by the Q-learning algorithm (4) converges.
Let Q˜∗ be the limit, i.e., Q˜∗ = limn→∞Qn. Suppose the objective of an adversary is to
induce the RL agent to learn a particular policy w†. The adversary’s problem then is to
design c˜ by applying the actions available to him based on the information he has so that
the limit Q-factors learned from the Q-learning algorithm produce the policy targeted
by the adversary w†, i.e, Q˜∗ ∈ Vw† , where
Vw := {Q ∈ R
S×A : w(i) = argmin
a
Q(i,a),∀i ∈S }.
In next section, we will develop theoretical underpinnings to address the issues re-
garding the convergence of (4) and the attainability of the adversarial objectives.
3 Analysis of Q-Learning with Falsified Cost
3.1 Convergence of Q-Learning Algorithm with Falsified Cost
In Q-learning algorithm (2), to guarantee almost sure convergence, the agent usually
takes tapering stepsize [4] {a(n)}which satisfies 0< a(n)≤ 1, n≥ 0, and ∑n a(n) = ∞,
∑n a(n)
2 < ∞. Suppose in our problem, the agent takes tapering stepsize. To address the
convergence issues, we have the following result.
Lemma 1. If an adversary performs stealthy attacks with bounded c˜(i,a) for all i ∈
S ,a ∈ A , then the Q-learning algorithm with falsified costs converges to the fixed
point of F˜(Q) almost surely where the mapping F˜ :RS×A →RS×A is defined as F˜(Q) =
[F˜ia(Q)]i,a with
F˜ia(Q) = β ∑
j
p(i, j,a)min
b
Q( j,b)+ c˜(i,a),
and the fixed point is unique and denoted by Q˜∗.
Sketch of Proof. If the adversary performs stealthy attacks, the falsified costs for each
state-action pair are consistent during the learning process. The Q learning process
thus can be written as (4). Rewrite (4) as Qn+1 = Qn+ a(n)
[
h˜(Qn)+M(n+ 1)
]
, where
h˜(Q) := F˜(Q)−Q andM(n+ 1) is given as
Mia(n+ 1) = β
(
min
b
Qn(Ψn+1(i,a),b)−∑
j
p(i, j,a)(min
b
Qn( j,b))
)
, i ∈ S,a ∈ A.
Note that for any Q1,Q2, h˜(Q1)− h˜(Q2) and F˜(Q1)− F˜(Q2) do not depend on the
falsified costs. If the falsified costs are bounded, one can see that h˜(Q) is Lipschitz.
And M(n+ 1) is a Martingale difference sequence. Following the arguments in [4]
(Theorem 2 Chapter 2) and Section 3.2 of [5], we can see the iterates of (4) converges
almost surely to the fixed points of F˜ . Since F˜ is a contraction mapping with respect to
the max norm, with contraction factor β [3] (pp. 250), by Banach fixed point theorem
(contraction theorem), F˜ admits a unique fixed point.
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It is not surprising that one of the conditions given in Lemma 1 that guarantees
convergence is that an attacker performs stealthy attacks. The convergence can be guar-
anteed because the falsified cost signals are consistent over time for each state action
pair. The uniqueness of Q˜∗ comes from the fact that if c˜(i,a) is bounded for every
(i,a) ∈ S ×A , F˜ is a contraction mapping. By Banach’s fixed point theorem [13], F˜
admits a unique fixed point. With this lemma, we conclude that an adversary can make
the algorithm converge to a limit point by stealthily falsifying the cost signals.
Remark 2. Whether an adversary aims for the convergence of the Q-learning algorithm
(4) or not depends on his objective. In our setting, the adversary intends to mislead the
RL agent to learn policy w†, indicating that the adversary promotes convergence and
aim to have the limit point Q˜∗ lie in Vw† .
3.2 How is the Limit Point Affected by the Falsified Cost
Now it remains to analyze, from the adversary’s perspective, how to falsify the cost
signals so that the limit point that algorithm (4) converges to is desired by the adversary.
In later discussions, we consider stealthy attacks where the falsified costs are consistent
for the same state action pairs. Denote the true cost by matrix c ∈ RS×A with [c]i,a =
c(i,a) and the falsified cost is described by a matrix c˜∈RS×A with [c˜]i,a = c˜(i,a). Given
c˜, the fixed point of F˜ is uniquely decided, i.e., the point that the algorithm (4) converges
to is uniquely determined. Thus, there is a mapping c˜ 7→ Q˜∗ implicitly described by the
relation F˜(Q) = Q. For convenience, this mapping is denoted by f :RS×A → RS×A.
Theorem 1. Let Q˜∗ denote the Q-factor learned from algorithm (4) with falsified cost
signals and Q∗ be the Q-factor learned from (2) with true cost signals. There exists a
constant L< 1 such that
‖Q˜∗−Q∗‖ ≤
1
1−L
‖c˜− c‖, (5)
and L= β where discounted factor β has been defined in the MDP-FC problem.
Proof. Define F˜(Q) as F˜ia(Q) = β ∑ j p(i, j,a)minbQ( j,b)+ c(i,a). From Lemma 1,
we know that Q˜∗ and Q∗ satisfy Q˜∗ = F˜(Q˜∗) and Q∗ = F(Q∗). We have Q˜∗− Q˜ =
F˜(Q˜∗)−F(Q∗). Since F˜ and F are both contraction mappings, by triangle inequality,
we have ‖Q˜∗−Q∗‖ ≤ L‖Q˜∗−Q∗‖+ ‖c˜− c‖. Thus, we have (5). And the contraction
factor L for F˜ and F is β .
Remark 3. In fact, taking this argument just slightly further, one can conclude that fal-
sification on cost c using a tiny perturbation does not cause significant changes in the
limit point of algorithm (2), Q∗. This feature indicates that an adversary cannot cause a
significant change in the limit Q-factor by just a small perturbation in the cost signals.
This is a feature known as stability that is observed in problems that possess contraction
mapping properties. Also, Theorem 1 indicates that the mapping c˜ 7→ Q˜∗ is continuous,
and to be more specific, it is uniformly Lipchitz continuous with Lipchitz constant
1/(1−β ).
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With Theorem 1, we can now characterize the minimum level of falsification an
adversary needs to change the policy from the true optimal policy w∗ to the policy w†
that the adversary aims for. First, note that Vw ⊂ R
S×A and it can be also written as
Vw = {Q ∈ R
S×A : Q(i,w(i)) < Q(i,a),∀i ∈S ,∀a 6= w(i)}. (6)
We can easily see that for any given policy w, Vw is a convex set, hence connected. This
is because for any λ ∈ [0,1], if Q1,Q2 ∈ Vw, λQ1+(1−λ )Q2 ∈ Vw. Second, for any
two different policies w1 and w2, Vw1 ∩Vw2 =∅. Define the infimum distance between
the true optimal policy w∗ and the adversary desired policy w† in terms of the Q-values
by
D(w∗,w†) := inf
Q1∈Vw∗ ,Q2∈Vw†
‖Q1−Q2‖,
which is also the definition of the distance between two sets Vw∗ and Vω† . Note that
for w∗ 6= w† (otherwise, the optimal policy w∗ is what the adversary desire, there is
no incentive for the adversary to attack), D(w∗,w†) is always zero according to the
definition of the set (6). This counterintuitive result states that a small change in the
Q-value may result in any possible change of policy learned by the agent from the
Q-learning algorithm (4). Compared with Theorem 1 which is a negative result to the
adversary, this result is in favor of the adversary.
Similarly, define the pointQ∗ to set Vw† distance byDQ∗(w
†) := infQ∈V
w†
‖Q−Q∗‖.
Thus, if Q˜∗ ∈ Vw† , we have
0= D(w∗,w†)≤ DQ∗(w
†)≤ ‖Q˜∗−Q∗‖ ≤
1
1−β
‖c˜− c‖, (7)
where the first inequality comes from the fact thatQ∗ ∈ Vw∗ and the second inequality is
due to Q˜∗ ∈Vw† . The robust region for the true cost c to the adversary’s targeted policy
w† is given by B(c;(1− β )DQ∗(w
†)) which is an open ball with center c and radius
(1−β )DQ∗(w
†). That means the attacks on the cost needs to be ‘powerful’ enough to
drive the falsified cost c˜ outside the ball B(c;(1−β )DQ∗(w
†)) to make the RL agent
learn the policy w†. If the falsified cost c˜ is within the ball, the RL agent can never learn
the adversary’s targeted policy w†. The ball B(c;(1−β )DQ∗(w
†)) depends only on the
true cost c and the adversary desired policy w† (Once the MDP is given, Q∗ is uniquely
determined by c). Thus, we refer this ball as the robust region of the true cost c to the
adversarial policy w†. As we have mentioned in Section 2.2, if the actions available
to the adversary only allows him to perform bounded falsification on cost signals and
the bound is smaller than the radius of the robust region, then the adversary can never
mislead the agent to learn policy w†.
Remark 4. First, in discussions above, the adversary policy w† can be any possible
polices and the discussion remains valid for any possible policies. Second, set Vw of
Q-values is not just a convex set but also an open set. We thus can see that DQ∗(w
†)> 0
for any w† 6= w∗ and the second inequality in (7) can be replaced by a strict inequality.
Third, the agent can estimate his own robustness to falsification if he can know the
adversary desired policy w†. For an omniscient attacker or attackers who have access
to true cost signals, the attacker can compute the robust region of the true cost to his
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desired policy w† to evaluate whether the objective is feasible or not. When it is not
feasible, the attacker can consider changing his objectives, e.g., selecting other favored
policies that have a smaller robust region.
We have discussed how falsification affects the change of Q-factors learned by the
agent in a distance sense. The problem now is to study how to falsify the true cost in a
right direction so that the resulted Q-factors fall into the favored region of an adversary.
One difficulty of analyzing this problem comes from the fact that the mapping c˜ 7→ Q˜∗
is not explicit known. The relation between c˜ and Q˜∗ is governed by the Q-learning
algorithm (4). Another difficulty is that due to the fact that both c˜ and Q˜∗ lies in the
space of RS×A, we need to resort to Fre´chet derivative or Gaˆteaux derivative [7] (if they
exist) to characterize how a small change of c˜ results in a change in Q˜∗.
From Lemma 1 and Theorem 1, we know that Q-learning algorithm converges to
the unique fixed point of F˜ and that f : c˜ 7→ Q˜∗ is uniformly Lipschitz continuous. Also,
it is easy to see that the inverse of f , denoted by f−1, exists since given Q˜∗, c˜ is uniquely
decided by the relation F˜(Q) = Q. Furthermore, by the relation F˜(Q) = Q, we know
f is both injective and surjective and hence a bijection which can be simply shown by
arguing that given different c˜, the solution of F˜(Q) = Q must be different. This fact
informs that there is a one-to-one, onto correspondence between c˜ and Q˜∗. One should
note that the mapping f :RS×A→RS×A is not uniformly Fre´chet differentiable onRS×A
due to the min operator inside the relation F˜(Q) = Q. However, for any policy w, f is
Fre´chet differentiable on f−1(Vw) which is an open set and connected due to the fact
that Vw is open and connected and f is continuous.
Proposition 1. The map f :RS×A→RS×A is Fre´chet differentiable onVw for any policy
w and the Fre´chet derivative of f at any point c˜ ∈ Vw, denoted by f
′(c˜), is a linear
bounded map G :RS×A → RS×A that does not depend on c˜, and Gh is given as
[Gh]i,a = βP
T
ia(I−βPw)
−1hw+ h(i,a) (8)
for every i ∈S ,a ∈A .
Proof. Suppose c ∈ f−1(Vw) and c˜= c+h ∈ f
−1(Vw). By definition, Q
∗, Q˜∗ ∈ Vw. By
Lemma 1, we have Q˜∗ = F˜(Q˜∗) and Q∗ = F(Q∗) which means
Q˜∗(i,a) = βPiaQ˜
∗
w+ c˜(i,a) = βPiaQ˜
∗
w+ c(i,a)+ h(i,a),
Q∗(i,a) = βPiaQ
∗
w+ c(i,a), ∀i ∈S ,a ∈A .
(9)
From (9), we have Q∗w = βPwQ
∗
w + cw. Thus, Q
∗
w = (I− βPw)
−1cw. Similarly, Q˜
∗
w =
(I−βPw)
−1(cw+hw), where (I−βPw) is invertible due to the fact that β < 1 and Pw is
a stochastic matrix. Thus, Q˜∗w =Q
∗
w+(I−βPw)
−1hw. Substitute it into the first equation
of (9), one have
Q˜∗(i,a) = βPia(Q
∗
w+(I−βPw)
−1hw)+ c(i,a)+ h(i,a)
= Q∗(i,a)+βPia(I−βPw)
−1hw+ h(i,a).
Then, one can see ‖ f (c+ h)− f (c)−Gh‖/‖h‖→ 0 as ‖h‖→ 0.
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From Proposition 1, we can see that f is Fre´chet differentiable on f−1(Vw) and
the derivative is constant, i.e., f ′(c˜) = G for any c˜ ∈ f−1(Vw). Note that G lies in the
space of all linear mappings that maps RS×A to itself and G is determined only by the
discount factor β and the transition kernel P of the MDP problem. The region where
the differentiability may fail is f−1(RS×A\(∪wVw)), where R
S×A\(∪wVw) is the set
{Q : ∃i,∃a= a′,Q(i,a) = Q(i,a′) =minbQ(i,b)}. This set contains the places where a
change of policy happens, i.e., Q(i,a) and Q(i,a′) are both the lowest value among the
ith row of Q. Also, due to the fact that f is Lipschitz, by Rademacher’s theorem, f is
differentiable almost everywhere (w.r.t. the Lebesgue measure).
Remark 5. One can view f as a ‘piece-wise linear function’ in the norm vector space
R
S×A instead of in a real line. Actually, if the adversary can only falsify the cost at one
state-action pair, say (i,a), while costs at other pairs are fixed, then for every j ∈S ,b∈
A , the function c˜(i,a) 7→ [Q˜∗] j,b is a piece-wise linear function.
Given any c ∈ f−1(Vw), if an adversary falsifies the cost c by injecting value h, i.e.,
c˜ = c+ h, the adversary can see how the falsification cause a change in Q-values. To
be more specific, if Q∗ is the Q-values learned from cost c by Q-learning algorithm
(2), after the falsification c˜, the Q-value learned fromQ-learning algorithm (4) becomes
Q˜∗ = Q∗+Gh if c˜ ∈ f−1(Vw). Then, an omniscient adversary can utilize (8) to find a
way of falsification h such that Q˜∗ can be driven to approach a desired set Vw† bearing
in mind that D(w,w†) = 0 for any two policies w,w†. One difficulty is to see whether
c˜ ∈ f−1(Vw) because the set f
−1(Vw) is now implicit. Thus, we resort to the following
theorem.
Theorem 2. Let Q˜∗ ∈RS×A be the Q-values learned from the Q-learning algorithm (4)
with the falsified cost c˜ ∈RS×A. Then Q˜∗ ∈ Vw† if and only if the falsified cost signals c˜
designed by the adversary satisfy the following conditions
c˜(i,a)> (1i−βPia)
T (I−βPw†)
−1c˜w† . (10)
for all i ∈S , a ∈A \{w†(i)}.
Sketch of Proof. If Q˜∗ ∈Vw† , from proof of Proposition 1, we know Q˜
∗
w†
=(I−βPw†)
−1c˜w†
and the ith component of Q˜∗
w†
is strictly less than Q˜∗(i,a) for each a∈A \{w†(i)}. That
means Q˜∗(i,a) > 1Ti Q˜
∗
w†
which gives us (10). Conversely, if c˜ satisfy conditions (10),
Q˜∗ ∈ Vw† due to the one-to-one, onto correspondence between c˜ and Q˜
∗.
With the results in Theorem 2, we can characterize the set f−1(Vw). Elements in
f−1(Vw) have to satisfy the conditions given in (10). Also, Theorem 2 indicates that
if an adversary intends to mislead the agent to learn policy w†, the falsified cost c˜ has
to satisfy the conditions specified in (10). Note that for a = w†(i), c˜(i,w†(i)) ≡ (1i−
βPiw†(i))
T (I−βPw†)
−1c˜w† .
If the objective of an omnisicent attacker is to induce the agent to learn policy w†
while minimizing his own cost of attacking, i.e., the attack’s problem we have formu-
lated in (3) in Section 2.2. Given AttackCost(c˜) = ‖c˜− c‖ where c is the true cost, the
attacker’s problem is to solve the following minimization problem
min
c˜∈RS×A
‖c˜− c‖ s.t. (10) (11)
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Remark 6. If the norm in the attacker’s problem (11) is a Frobenius norm, the attacker’s
problem is a convex minimization problem which can be easily solved by omniscient
attackers using software packages like MOSEK [14], CVX [11] etc. If AttackCost(c˜) is
the number of state-action pair where the cost has been falsified, i.e.,, AttakCost(c˜) =
∑i ∑a 1 {c(i,a) 6=c˜(i,a)}, then the attacker’s problem becomes a combinatorial optimization
problem [24].
Remark 7. If the actions available to an adversary only allow the adversary to falsify
the true cost at certain states S ′ ⊂ S (or/and at certain actions A ′ ⊂ A ), then the
adversary’s problem (11) becomes
min
c˜∈RS×A
‖c˜− c‖
s.t. (10)
c˜(i,a) = c(i,a) ∀i ∈S \S ′,a ∈A \A ′.
However, if an adversary can only falsify at certain states S ′, the adversary may not be
able to manipulate the agent to learn w†.
Without loss of generality, suppose that the adversary can only falsify the cost at a
subset of states S ′ = {1,2, ...,S′}. We rewrite the conditions given in (10) into a more
compact form:
c˜a ≥ (I−βPa)(I−βPw†)
−1c˜w† ,∀ a ∈A , (12)
where the equality only holds for one component of the vector, i.e., the i-th component
satisfying w(i) = a. Partition the vector c˜a and c˜w† in (12) into two parts, the part where
the adversary can falsify the cost denoted by c˜
f al
a , c˜
f al
w†
∈ RS
′
and the part where the
adversary cannot falsify ctruea ,c
true
w†
∈ RS−S
′
.
[
c˜
f al
a
ctruea
]
≥
[
Ra Ya
Ma Na
][
c˜
f al
w†
ctrue
w†
]
, ∀ a ∈A (13)
where [
Ra Ya
Ma Na
]
:= (I−βPa)(I−βPw†)
−1, ∀ a ∈A
and Ra ∈ R
S′×S′ ,Ya ∈ R
S′×(S−S′),Ma ∈ R
(S−S′)×S′ ,Na ∈ R
(S−S′)×(S−S′). Note that the ith
component of c˜
f al
w†(i)
is equal to the i component of c˜
f al
w†
. If the adversary aims to mislead
the agent to learn w†, the adversary needs to design c˜
f al
a ,a ∈A such that the conditions
in (13) hold. Whether the conditions in (13) are easy for an adversary to achieve or
not depends on the true costs ctruea ,a ∈ A . The following results state that under some
conditions on the transition probability, no matter what the true costs are, the adversary
can find proper c˜
f al
a ,a ∈ A such that conditions (13) are satisfied. For i ∈ S \S
′, if
w(i) = a, we remove the rows ofMa that correspond to the state i ∈S \S
′. Denote the
new matrix after the row removals by M¯a.
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Theorem 3. Define H := [M¯Ta1 M¯
T
a2
· · · M¯TaA ]
T ∈ R(A(S−S
′)−S′)×S′ . If there exists x ∈
R
S′ such that Hx < 0, i.e., the column space of H intersects the negative orthant of
R
A(S−S′)−S′ , then for any true cost, the adversary can find c˜
f al
a ,a ∈A such that condi-
tions (13) hold.
Proof. We can rewrite (13) as c˜
f al
a ≥ Rac˜
f al
w†
+Yac
true
w†
and ctruea ≥Mac˜
f al
w†
+Nac
true
w†
for
all a ∈ A . If there exists c˜
f al
w†
such that Mac˜
f al
w†
can be less than any given vector in
R
S−S′ , then ctruea ≥ Mac˜
f al
w†
+Nac
true
w†
can be satisfied no matter what the true cost is.
We need ctruea ≥Mac˜
f al
w†
+Nac
true
w†
to hold for all a ∈ A , which means that we need the
range space of [MTa1 , ...,M
T
aA
]∈RA(S−S
′)×S′ to intersect the negative orthant. By using the
fact that c˜(i,w†(i)) ≡ (1i−βPiw†(i))
T (I−βPw†)
−1c˜w† , we can give less stringent con-
ditions. Actually, we only need the range space of H = [M¯Ta1 , ...,M¯
T
aA
] ∈R(A(S−S
′)−S′)×S′
to intersection the negative orthant. If this is true, then these exists c˜
f al
w†
such that
ctruea ≥Mac˜
f al
w†
+Nac
true
w†
is feasible for all a ∈A .
As for conditions c˜
f al
a ≥ Rac˜
f al
w†
+Yac
true
w†
, note that there are S′×A number of vari-
ables c˜
f al
a ,a ∈ A and that c˜
f al
w†
has been chosen such that conditions ctruea ≥Mac˜
f al
w†
+
Nac
true
w†
are satisfied. One can choose the remaining variables in c˜
f al
a ,a ∈A sufficiently
large to satisfy ctruea ≥Mac˜
f al
w†
+Nac
true
w†
due to the fact that c˜(i,w†(i))≡ (1i−βPiw†(i))
T (I−
βPw†)
−1c˜w† .
Note that H only depends on the transition probability and the discount factor, if an
omniscient adversary can only falsify cost signals at states denoted by S ′, an adversary
can check if the range space ofH intersects with the negative orthant of RA(S−S
′) or not.
If it does, the adversary can mislead the agent to learn w† by falsifying costs at a subset
of state space no matter what the true cost is.
Remark 8. To check whether the condition on H is true or not, one has to resort to
Gordan’s theorem [6]: EitherHx< 0 has a solution x, orHT y= 0 has a nonzero solution
y with y ≥ 0. The adversary can use linear/convex programming software to check if
this is the case. For example, by solving
min
y∈RA(S−S
′)
‖HTy‖ s.t. ‖y‖= 1, y≥ 0, (14)
the adversary knows whether the condition about H given in Theorem 3 is true or not.
If the minimum of (14) is 0, the adversary cannot guarantee that, for any given true
cost, the agent learns the policy w†. If the minimum of (14) is positive, there exists x
such that Hx< 0. The adversary can select c˜ f al
w†
= λx and choose a sufficiently large λ
to make sure that conditions (13) hold, which means an adversary can make the agent
learn the policy w† by falsifying costs at a subset of state space no matter what the true
costs are.
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4 Numerical Example
In this section, we use the application of RL in water reservoir operations to illustrate
the security issues of RL. Consider a RL agent aiming to create the best operation
policies for the hydroelectric reservoir system described in Fig. 2. The system consists
of the following: (1) an inflow conduit regulated by Val0, which can either be a river
or a spillway from another dam; and (2) two spillways for outflow: the first penstock,
Val1, which is connected to the turbine and thus generates electricity, and the second
penstock, Val2, allowing direct water evacuation without electricity generation.We con-
sider three reservoir levels: MinOperL, MedOperL, MaxExtL. Weather conditions and
the operation of valves are key factors that affect the reservoir level. In practice, there
are usually interconnected hydroelectric reservoir systems located at different places
which makes it difficult to find an optimal operational policy.
Valve 0
Valve 1
Valve 2
Water 
Level
TurbineMax. Ext. Level
Med. Oper. Level
Min. Oper. Level
Overflow Level. Caution!
Fig. 2. A hydroelectric reservoir system.
For illustrative purposes, we only consider controlling of Val1. Thus, we have two
actions: either a1,Val1 = ‘shut down’; or a2, Val1 = ‘open’. Hence A = {a1,a2}.
We consider three states which represent three different reservoir levels, denoted by
S = {1,2,3}where 1(2,3) representsMaxExtL (MedOperL, MinOperL, respectively).
The goal of the operators is to generate more electricity to increase economic benefits,
which requires the reservoir to store a sufficient amount of water to generate electricity.
Meanwhile, the operator also aims to avoid possible overflows which can be caused by
the unexpected heavy rain in the reservoir area or in upper areas. The operator needs to
learn a safe policy, i.e., the valve needs to be open at state 1 so that the cost at c(1,a1)
needs to be high. We assume that the uncertain and intermittent nature is captured by
the transition probability given by
Pa1 =

 1 0 00.6 0.4 0
0.1 0.5 0.4

 ,Pa2 =

0.3 0.7 00.1 0.2 0.7
0 0 1

 .
And the true cost is assumed to be c = [30 − 5;6 − 10;0 0]. Negative cost can be
interpreted as the reward for hydroelectric production. Let the discounted factor β be
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0.8. The limit Q-values learned from Q-learning algorithm (2) is approximately Q∗ =
 8.71 −26.6129−15.48 −27.19
−19.12 −15.30

 . The optimal policy thus is w∗(1) = a2,w∗(2) = a2,w∗(3) = a1.
Basically, the optimal policy indicates that one should keep the valve open to avoid
overflowing and generate more electricity at MaxExtL. While at MinOperL, one should
keep the valve closed to store more water for water supply and power generation pur-
poses. From (5), we know that the resulting change in Q∗ under malicious falsification
is bounded by the change in the cost with a Lipschitz constant 1/(1−β ). To see this,
we randomly generate 100 falsifications h ∈ R3×2 using randi(10) * rand(3,2) in Mat-
lab. For each falsified cost c˜= c+h, we obtain the correspondingQ-factors Q˜∗. We plot
‖Q˜∗−Q∗‖ corresponding with ‖c˜− c‖ for each falsification in Fig. 3. One can clearly
see the bound given in (5). The result in Fig. 3 corroborates Theorem 1.
0 5 10 15 200
20
40
60
80
100
‖c˜− c‖
‖
Q˜
⋆
−
Q
⋆
‖
 
 
Generated Costs
1
1−β‖c˜− c‖
Fig. 3. ‖Q˜∗−Q∗‖ versus ‖c˜−c‖ with 100 falsifications.
Suppose that the adversary aims to mislead the agent to learn a policy w† where
w†(1) = a1, w
†(2) = a2, w
†(3) = a1. The purpose is to keep the valve shut down at
MaxExtL which will cause overflow and hence devastating consequences. The adver-
sary can utilize DQ∗(w
†) to see how much at least he has to falsify the original cost c˜
to achieve the desired policy w†. The value of DQ∗(w
†) can be obtained by solving the
following optimization problem:
min
Q∈R3×2
‖Q−Q∗‖
s.t. Q(1,a1)≤ Q(1,a2),Q(2,a2)≤ Q(1,a1),Q(3,a1)≤ Q(3,a2).
The value of DQ∗(w
†) is thus 17.66. By (5), we know that to achieve w†, the adversary
has to falsify the cost such that ‖c˜−c‖ ≥ (1−β )DQ∗(w
†) = 3.532. If the actions avail-
able to the adversary are to perform only bounded falsification to one state-action pair
with bound 3.5, then it is impossible for the adversary to attain its goal, i.e., misleading
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the agent to the policy w† targeted by the adversary. Thus, in this MDP-FC, the robust
region of c to the adversary’s desired policy w† is 3.532.
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Fig. 4. The change of the limit Q-values when only the cost at one state-action pair is altered.
Black line corresponds to state 1, red line corresponds to state 2 and green line corresponds to
state 3. Solid (dash) line corresponds to a1 (a2).
In Fig. 4, we plot the change of the limit Q-values when only the cost at one state-
action pair is falsified while the other components are fixed at c= [9 − 5;6 − 10;0 0].
We can see that when the other costs are fixed, for every j ∈ {1,2,3},b ∈ {a1,a2} the
function c˜(i,a) 7→ [Q˜∗] j,b is piece-wise linear. And the change of slope happens only
when the policy changes. This illustrates our argument about the differentiability of the
mapping c˜ 7→ Q˜∗ in Proposition 1. From the first two plots, one can see that changes in
costs at one state can deviate the policy at another state. That is when altering the cost
at MedOperL, an adversary can make the valve open at MinOperL so that the reservoir
cannot store enough water to maintain the water supply and generate electricity. When
an adversary aims to manipulate the policy at one state, he does not have to alter the cost
at this state. Fig. 5 illustrates Proposition 1 when costs corresponding to two state-action
pairs are altered.
Furthermore, to illustrate Proposition 1 in general cases, i.e., in R3×2, suppose c=
[9 −5;6 −10;0 0], the Q-factors learned from c is Q∗ = [−12.29 −26.61; −15.47 −
27.19; −19.12 −15.30]. The optimal policy is thusw∗(1)= a2,w
∗(2)= a2,w
∗(3)= a1.
By (8) in Proposition 1, the derivative of f :R3×2 at c ∈ f−1(Vw∗) is a linearly bounded
map G : R3×2 → R3×2
[Gh]i,a = 0.8P
T
ia
(1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1

− 0.8

0.3 0.7 00.1 0.2 0.7
0.1 0.5 0.4

)−1

h(1,a2)h(2,a2)
h(3,a1)

+ h(i,a). (15)
One can see that G is a constant independent of c. Suppose that the adversary fal-
sifies the cost from c to c˜ by h, i.e., c˜ = c+ h and h =

0.6 −0.21 2
0.4 0.7

. Then, Gh =
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Fig. 5. the alteration of the limit Q-values when only the costs c˜(2,1), c˜(1,1) are altered.

3.74 3.924.70 5.68
4.39 4.21

 by (15). Thus, c˜ = c+ h =

9.6 −5.27 −8
0.4 0.7

. The Q-factors learned from c˜
is Q˜∗ =

 −8.55 −22.69−10.77 −21.51
−14.73 −11.08

 . The resulting policy is still w∗. One thus can see that
Q˜∗ = Q∗+Gh.
If an adversary aims to have the hydroelectric reservoir system operate based on
a policy w†, the falsified cost c˜ has to satisfy conditions given in (10). Let the tar-
geted policy of the adversary be w†(1) = a1,w
†(2) = a2,w
†(3) = a2. If the adver-
sary can deceptively falsify the cost at every state-action pair to any value, it is not
difficult to find c˜ satisfying (10). For example, the adversary can first select c˜w† =
[c˜(1,a1) c˜(2,a2) c˜(3,a2)]
T , e.g., c˜w† = [3 2 1]
T . Then select cost at other state-action
pairs following c˜(i,a) = (1i−βPia)
T (I−βPw†)
−1c˜w† + ξ for i ∈ S ,a ∈ A \{w
†(i)},
where ξ > 0. Then, c˜ satisfies conditions (10). For example if an adversary choose
ξ = 1, the adversary will have c˜ = [3 10.86;−1.34 2;0.34 1]. The Q-factors learned
from c˜ is Q˜∗ = [15 18.46;8.15 7.14;5.99 5; ]. Thus, the resulted policy is the adversary
desired policy w†. Hence, we say if the adversary can deceptively falsify the cost at
every state-action pair to any value, the adversary can make the RL agent learn any
policy.
If an adversary can only deceptively falsify the cost at states S ′, we have to resort
to Theorem 3 to see what he can achieve. Suppose that S ′ = {1,2} and the adversary
desires policyw†(1)= a1,w
†(2)= a2,w
†(3)= a2. GivenS
′ andw†, (13) can be written
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as 
c˜(1,a1)c˜(2,a1)
c(3,a1)

≥

 1.0000 0 0−2.0762 0.8095 2.2667
−0.5905 −0.4762 2.0667



c˜(1,a1)c˜(2,a2)
c(3,a2)

 ,

c˜(1,a2)c˜(2,a2)
c(3,a2)

≥

3.5333 −0.6667 −1.86670 1.0000 0
0 0 1.0000



c˜(1,a1)c˜(2,a2)
c(3,a2)

 .
(16)
Since the last row in the second equality is automatically satisfied, we haveH = [−0.5906 −
0.4762] whose range space is R which intersects (−∞,0). Thus, no matter what values
c(3,a1) and c(3,a2) are, the adversary can always find c˜(1,a1), c˜(2,a2) such that
c(3,a1)>Ma1
[
c˜(1,a1)
c˜(2,a2)
]
+ 2.0667× c(3,a2).
Next, choose c˜(2,a1) and c˜(1,a2) by
c˜(2,a1)>
[
−2.0762 0.8095 2.2667
]c˜(1,a1)c˜(2,a2)
c(3,a2)


c˜(1,a2)>
[
3.5333 −0.6667 −1.8667
]c˜(1,a1)c˜(2,a2)
c(3,a2)

 .
We hence can see that no matter what the true cost is, the adversary can make the RL
agent learn w† by falsifying only the cost at sates S ′ = {1,2}. It can also be easily seen
that when the adversary can only falsify the cost at state S = {1}, he can still make the
RL agent learn the policy w† independent of the true cost.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, a general framework has been introduced to study RL under deceptive
falsifications of cost signals where a number of attack models have been presented. We
have provided theoretical underpinnings for understanding the fundamental limits and
performance bounds on the attack and the defense in RL systems. The robust region of
the cost can be utilized by both offensive and defensive sides. A RL agent can leverage
the robust region to evaluate the robustness to malicious falsifications. An adversary can
use it to estimate whether certain objectives can be achieved or not. Conditions given
in Theorem 2 provide a fundamental understanding of the possible strategic adversarial
behavior of the adversary. Theorem 3 helps understand the attainability of an adver-
sary’s objective. Future work would focus on investigating a particular attack model we
have presented in Section 2.2 and developing defensive strategies based on the analyti-
cal tools we have introduced.
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